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I. INTRODUCTION
A hybrid vehicle typically combines a conventional internal
combustion engine propulsion system with an electric propulsion
system. This dual engine system allows the vehicle to achieve better
fuel economy than a purely gasoline powered system. The added
benefit of the dual engine system is reduced fossil fuel
dependency, which can decrease an individual vehicle's carbon
footprint through lower emissions. Reduced emissions, in turn,
lessen a vehicle's impact on climate and local air quality. But
beginning in 2007, when city governments across the United States
pushed for hybrid integration into taxicab fleets, taxicab
companies fought back with a seldom-invoked federal preemption
provision in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.1
The Supreme Court once recognized that "[1]egislation
designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe
clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional
concept of what is compendiously known as the police power."2 In
exercising that power, "states and their instrumentalities may act,
in many areas of interstate commerce . . . concurrently with the
federal government."3 These residual state rights to govern
traditional and local matters were not wholly abdicated to the
federal government, yet the limitations on local power are clear:
"Evenhanded local regulation to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest is valid unless preempted by federal action . .. .4
In 1963, Congress stepped into traditional and locIl matters
* The title was inspired by the documentary WHO KILLED THE ELECTRIC CAR? (Sony
Pictures 2006).
** Law Fellow, Appeals & Legislation, City of Philadelphia Law Department. Duke
University School of Law, J.D./LL.M.; University of California, Berkeley, B.A. I express my
sincere appreciation for the hard work and valuable insight of the Stanford Environmental
Law Journal staff. Also, special thanks to Scott Thompson. The views expressed in this
article are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent the views or position of the
City of Philadelphia.
1. 49 U.S.C. § 32919 (2011).
2. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 443.
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with the enactment of the Clean Air Act, but even after the Act's
initial ratification and all the subsequent amendments, states
remain responsible for implementing plans to clean up polluted
areas.5 This preserves the traditional function of the states in
regulating local air quality, allowing each local government to
consider its unique industries, geography, and concerns in
responding to air degradation. The interplay between state and
federal laws must be carefully defined so as to preserve the
traditional roles of the states unless Congress clearly and directly
intends to preempt traditionally local matters.6
In Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade v. City of New York,7 the
Second Circuit ignored this principle of federal preemption and
greatly expanded the Energy Policy and Conservation Act's
preemption provision8 to essentially allow Congress to preempt a
field wholly unrelated to the act: municipal regulation of taxicabs.
The court held that New York City's green incentive plan aimed at
shifting the cost structure in taxicab fee arrangements and
encouraging the purchase of new hybrid vehicles was preempted
by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act because the plan drew a
distinction between hybrid and non-hybrid vehicles.9 As a result,
taxicab drivers, who bear the burden of rising fuel prices, must
continue to shoulder the inefficiencies of the leased automobiles,
and city residents must continue to shoulder the environmental
burden of dirty cars. And more significantly, cities across the
United States are now wary of similar challenges to proposed green
incentive plans and have halted innovative measures to address
clean air and climate change in their respective municipalities.
In Part II, this Article introduces the basic concepts of federal
preemption and the arguments in favor of state and local
5. Air pollution prevention and control at its source "is the primary responsibility of
the States and local governments," but federal financial assistance and leadership is
"essential for the development of cooperative Federal, State, regional, and local programs
to prevent and control air pollution." 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 (a) (3)-(4) (2011).
6. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, 77te Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499 (1995)
(discussing the history of federalism).
7. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 10-618 2011 WL 677133 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2011).
8. The preemption provision reads: "[w]hen an average fuel economy standard
prescribed under this chapter is in effect, a State or [local government] may not adopt or
enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy
standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard under this
chapter." 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2011).
9. Id. at 157.
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programs in the absence of explicit federal preemption. Part III
explores the historical and regulatory background that prompted
Congress to enact the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. It
briefly discusses the automobile manufacturing industry and the
regulatory mechanism originally designed to alleviate United
States dependence on foreign oil and promote greater fuel
efficiency in newly manufactured automobiles. In Part IV, the
Article presents the two groups who first challenged state or local
regulations under the preemption provision of the Energy Policy
and Conservation Act and the few district court cases and the only
circuit court case which directly discuss the Act's preemption
provision. The Article then discusses the Second Circuit's holding
and some misgivings associated with the court's reasoning. Next,
the Article lays out the framework of the City of New York's
petition for writ of certiorari filed with the United States Supreme
Court following the Second Circuit's decision in Metropolitan
Taxicab. Finally, the Article discusses the potentially broad and
damaging implications of the Second Circuit's holding and
hopefully serves as a useful guide to avoid a similar result in other
cases.10
II. INTRODUCING PREEMPTION AND FEDERALISM
Statutory preemption is grounded in the Supremacy Clause,
which "invalidates state laws that 'interfere with, or are contrary
to,' federal law."I The Supreme Court has laid out three methods
by which a state or local law may be foreclosed: (1) by "express
language in a congressional enactment"; (2) by "implication from
the depth and breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies
the legislative field"; or (3) by "implication because of a conflict
with a congressional enactment."12 Where there is an express
preemption provision, the Court begins its analysis with "the text
of the provision in question, and move [s] on, as need be, to the
structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs."13 However,
10. During the course of publication, the Supreme Court denied petition for
certiorari. This leaves open the possibility that other circuits will confront similar
challenges under the EPCA.
11. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712
(1985) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)).
12. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001).
13. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995).
[Vol. 30:311314
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Congress' actual authority to regulate is not derived from the
Supremacy Clause-that power must be prescribed elsewhere in
the Constitution. 4
The Commerce Clause is perhaps the most flexible source of
congressional authority contained in the Constitution.15 This
flexibility comes with a caveat: the power to regulate must be
connected to interstate commerce, which, admittedly, constrains
little of Congress' authority:16 As vague as the caveat may be, the
scope of federal legislation must be confined to its Constitutional
source; otherwise Congress would have unfettered authority,
usurping the power and purpose of state and local governance:
"The sheer amount of regulation and the complexity of the issues
involved would place far too heavy a burden on Congress under an
exclusive system without overlap, and requires at least some
residual state regulatory powers."' 7 In most cases, in order to
preserve the virtues of federalism, the Supreme Court assumes
"that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by [a] [flederal [a]ct unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."18
Erwin Chemerinsky once noted, "discussions about federalism
are the ones where the underlying values are least discussed and
are the most disconnected from the legal doctrines."' 9 He urged
courts to employ a "functional analysis" to identify the nature of
state autonomy and answer the principal question of when and
how to allocate power between the federal government and state
governments. 20 One of the asserted values of federalism is that it
promotes the democratic ideal because state and local
governments are closer to their citizens and therefore more
accountable and responsive to local constituent needs.2' By
14. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 91, 101 (2003) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause conditions the
supremacy of federal statutes on their constitutionality and provides courts with the
authority to strike down federal laws not made "in pursuance" of the Constitution).
15. See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767,
777 (1994).
16. Id. at 779.
17. Id. at 780-81.
18. Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
19. Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 501 (noting also that "[t]he Court's decisions
about federalism rarely do more than offer slogans about the importance of autonomous
state governments").
20. Id. at 534.
21. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating that federalism
3152011]
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extension, unlike the federal government, states and cities can
productively compete with one another in order to attract
desirable citizens and businesses to aid in economic growth.22 A
third value is that decentralized decision-making allows more
opportunities for innovation and experimentation with social and
economic policy than does one centralized bureaucracy.23
Preserving this relationship is beneficial for the whole of the
United States. In the context of climate change, competition
among American municipalities has prompted some cities to
promote environmental action. Mayor Nutter of Philadelphia, for
instance, has announced his intent to make Philadelphia the
greenest city in the United States by 2015.24 But these ambitious
plans cannot succeed if federal preemption is broadly invoked and
forecloses local experimentation. In order to preserve the virtues
of local governance, Congress has a duty to clearly identify the
scope and purpose of federal statutes. Without clearer language
from Congress, courts must turn to the underlying values of the
legislation to understand the specific concerns that Congress
intended to address. For the Energy Policy and Conservation Act,
these concerns go back almost forty years.
III. BACKGROUND: THE OIL EMBARGO AND ENERGY INDEPENDENCE
On October 6, 1973, the Yom Kippur War broke in the Middle
East, in part prompting the Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries ("OPEC") to raise the posted price of oil by
70%, to $5.11 a barrel, and to cut production over time in five
"increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes"); DAVID L.
SHAPIRo, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91-92 (1995) (" [O]ne of the stronger arguments for a
decentralized political structure is that, to the extent the electorate is small, and elected
representatives are thus more immediately accountable to individuals and their concerns,
government is brought closer to the people, and democratic ideals are more fully
realized.").
22. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (stating that federalism "makes government more
responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry").
23. See id. (stating that federalism "allows for more innovation and experimentation
in government"); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-88
(1982) (O'Connor,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe
Court's decision undermines the most valuable aspects of our federalism. Courts and
commentators frequently have recognized that the 50 States serve as laboratories for the
development of new social, economic, and political ideas.").
24. See City of Phila., Greenworks Philadelphia, http://www.phila.gov/green/
greenworks/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
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percent increments. 25 The United States was quickly drawn into
the conflict when Congress approved $2.2 billion in aid for Israel. 26
This act provoked Libya and the other members of OPEC to
announce a total embargo on oil deliveries to the United States,
sparking the first global "energy crisis."27
Just a month later, President Nixon launched Project
Independence to achieve energy self-sufficiency by 1980, and
declared that American science, technology, and industry could
free the United States from dependence on foreign oil.2 8 Although
the embargo was lifted in March 1974,29 its effects persisted: that
year the price of oil quadrupled the prewar rate to nearly $12 a
barrel.30 In May 1974, the Federal Energy Administration was
created to replace the Federal Energy Office, which had been
assigned the tasks of "allocating reduced petroleum supplies to
refiners and consumers and . . . controlling the price of oil and
gasoline."31 On August 9, 1974, Gerald R. Ford became President;
just two months later, he signed the Energy Reorganization Act.3 2
On December 22, 1975, President Ford signed the Energy Policy
and Conservation Act ("EPCA"), which extended oil price
controls into 1979, mandated automobile fuel economy standards,
and authorized the creation of the United States Strategic
Petroleum Reserve.33 In 1977, the cabinet-level Department of
Energy was created to advance energy technology and promote
related innovation in the United States.34
A. The United States Automobile Industry From 1970 to 1985
At the beginning of the 1970s, American automobiles averaged
25. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER 605-07
(1990).
26. GEORGE LENCZOWSKI, AMERICAN PRESIDENTS AND THE MIDDLE EAST 130 (1990).
27. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Energy Timeline from 1971-1980, http://www.energy.gov/
about/timelinel971-1980.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
28. Id.
29. U.S. Dep't of Transp. Office of the Historian, A Chronology of Dates Significant in
the Background, Hlistorty, and Development of the Department of Transportation, http://dotlibrary.
dot.gov/Historian/chronology.htn (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
30. The Price of Oil, CBC NEWS, (July 18, 2007), available at http://www.cbc.ca
/news/background/oil/.






13.5 miles per gallon.35 But with the 1973 oil embargo, consumer
demand for large, fuel inefficient vehicles dropped dramatically
and the United States automobile industry quickly found itself
vulnerable to changes in domestic demand. American buyers
turned to the smaller, more efficient four cylinder imported
vehicles from Europe and Japan. This led Detroit's Big Three
(General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) to introduce the smaller
Chevrolet Chevette (1975), the Ford Fiesta (1976), and the Dodge
Omni/Plymouth Horizon (1978) from Chrysler, reflecting the
move towards front wheel drive transmissions.36 On June 26, 1977,
the Secretary of Transportation, Brock Adams, announced new
fuel economy standards, which he believed would demand lighter,
smaller cars. 7 By 1985, the average American fuel efficiency had
risen to 17.4 miles per gallon.38
B. EPCA Fuel Economy Standards
The EPCA is a forward-looking statute that creates the
Corporate Average Fuel Economy ("CAFE") program. Under this
program, at least eighteen months before the beginning of each
model year, the United States Department of Transportation
("DOT") must consult with the Secretary of Energy and the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), and
then establish federal fuel economy standards for all passenger
automobiles or light-duty trucks manufactured in that model
year.39 The Secretary of Transportation has delegated authority to
establish CAFE standards to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration ("NHTSA").40 When setting CAFE standards, the
NHTSA must weigh four factors: "technological feasibility,
economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle
standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of
the United States to conserve energy." 41 Specifically, the NHTSA
used an analytic model to inform its consideration of the 2011
35. DAVID FRUM, How WE GOT HERE: THE 70's 321-22 (2000).
36. Bryan T. Nicalek, The Dodge Omni and Plymouth Horizon,
http://www.allpar.com/omni/omni.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
37. U.S. Dep't of Transp. Office of the Historian, supra note 29.
38. FRUM, supra note 35, at 321-22.
39. 49 U.S.C.S. § 32902(a)-(b) (2011).
40. 49 C.F.R. § 1.50(f) (2011); see Nat'1 Highway Traffic Safety Admin., C41E Overview,
http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/ruiles/cafe/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
41. 49 U.S.C § 32902(f) (2011).
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CAFE standards for passenger automobiles, which required the
following inputs:
(1) a forecast of the future vehicle market, (2) estimates of the
availability, applicability, and incremental effectiveness and cost
of fuel-saving technologies, (3) estimates of vehicle survival and
mileage accumulation patterns, the rebound effect, future fuel
prices, the social cost of carbon, and many other economic
factors, (4) fuel characteristics and vehicular emission rates, and
(5) coefficients defining the shape and level of CAFE curves to be
examined.42
Some of these inputs are provided with consultation from the EPA,
as required by the EPCA.43 The EPA provides NHTSA with fuel
economy data and also calculates the average fuel economy for
each manufacturer."
Individual vehicles and models are not required to meet the
mileage standard. "Instead, EPCA requires that the average fuel
economy of a manufacturer's fleet of passenger cars (or light
trucks) in a particular model year must meet the standard for
those automobiles for that model year." 45 The required CAFE
standard is based on "target levels of average fuel economy set for
vehicles of different sizes and on the distribution of that
manufacturer's vehicles among those sizes." 46 Compliance is
determined by "comparing a manufacturer's harmonically
averaged fleet fuel economy levels in a model year with a required
fuel economy level [,] calculated using the manufacturer's actual
production levels and the targets for each [size] of the vehicles
that it produces."47 Manufacturers whose fleets fail to meet CAFE
standards are liable for a civil penalty of $5 per each tenth of a
42. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FINAL RULE, AVERAGE FUEL EcoNOMY
STANDARDS FOR PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS, MODEL YEAR 2011 37 (2009),
available at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/Rulemaking/Rules/Associated%20Files/CAFEUp
dated- FinalRuleMY201I.pdf.; see also 49 C.F.R. §§ 523, 531, 533-34, 536-37 (2011).
43. § 32902(k).
44. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., CAFE-Fuel Economy, http://www.nhtsa.
gov/fuel-economy (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
45. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FINAL RULE, supra note 42, at 72; see also
49 C.F.R. §§ 523, 531, 533-34, 536-37 (2011).
46. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FINAL RULE, supra note 42, at 36; see also
49 C.F.R. §§ 523, 531, 533-34, 536-37 (2011).
47. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FINAL RULE, supra note 42, at 36-37; see
also 49 C.F.R. §§ 523, 531, 533-34, 536-37 (2011).
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mile per gallon under the target value times the total volume of
vehicles manufactured for a given model year.48
As enacted, and substantively unamended, the EPCA includes a
general preemption provision, which provides that "[w]hen an
average fuel economy standard prescribed under this chapter is in
effect, a State or [local government] may not adopt or enforce a
law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel
economy standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel
economy standard under this chapter." 49 The provision was written
to preempt state and local regulation of average fuel economy
standards so that automobile manufacturers would not be required
to comply with numerous differing standards within a multiplicity
of state and local markets for automobiles.50 Imposing national
uniformity for fuel economy standards applicable to automobile
manufacturers would preemptively remove local burdens on
interstate commerce and allow manufacturers to develop
automobile designs for their fleets to be sold anywhere in the
nation.
Currently, the minimum standard for every domestically
manufactured passenger automobile is the greater of either 27.5
miles per gallon, or "ninety-two percent of the average fuel
economy projected by the Secretary for the combined domestic
and non-domestic passenger automobile fleets manufactured for
sale in the United States by all manufacturers in the model year...
."95 In December 2007, Congress increased the standard to at least
thirty-five miles per gallon for the total fleet, beginning with model
year 2020.52
IV. THIRTYYEARS LATER
Over thirty years after the OPEC oil embargo and the
enactment of the EPCA, the United States faces a growing concern
with greenhouse gas emissions and global climate change.53
Although the EPCA was originally created to reduce United States
dependence on foreign oil through improved fuel efficiency, there
is also a strong relationship between improving fuel efficiency and
48. 49 U.S.C. § 32912(b) (2011).
49. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2011)
50. See S. REP. No. 94-179, at 25 (1975).
51. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b) (4) (2011).
52. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b) (2)A) (2011).
53. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504-05 (2007).
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reducing carbon emissions. Carbon dioxide is a natural byproduct
of automobile fuel combustion: the more fuel an automobile
burns, the more carbon dioxide is emitted.5 4 Since the amount of
carbon dioxide emissions is directly related to the amount of fuel
combusted, requiring improvements in fuel efficiency has the
effect of reducing tailpipe carbon dioxide emissions.55
Currently, noncommercial automobiles are responsible for a
majority of United States transportation petroleum use and nearly
60% of all transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions.56
Moreover, in 2004, United States motor vehicles were responsible
for nearly 50% of the global concentration of greenhouse gases.57
And unless total fuel consumption dramatically changes, United
States motor vehicles will continue to contribute significantly to
global warming.58
Congress also requires the NHTSA to consider EPA's motor
vehicle emissions standards when setting fuel economy levels,
ensuring environmental concerns are given appropriate weight
when NHTSA balances its four factors.59 In fact, at the direction of
President Obama, NHTSA and EPA issued a Notice of Intent and
Technical Assessment Report on October 1, 2010, as the initial
steps toward developing future fuel economy and greenhouse gas
emissions regulations for light duty vehicles from model year 2017
and beyond.60 The national program is intended to cut down on
fuel costs, reduce dependence on petroleum, and protect the
environment by reducing greenhouse gas pollution that leads to
54. COMM. ON SCI. ENG'G AND PUB. POLICY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE
WARMING: MITIGATION, ADAPTION, AND THE Sci. BASE 287 (1992).
55. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FINAL RULE, supra note 42, at 49 ("By
2007, the average fuel economy of new passenger cars had increased to 31.3 mpg, causing
the emission of C02 to fall to 283.9 g/mi."); see also 49 C.F.R. §§ 523, 531, 533-34, 536-37
(2011).
56. Press Release, DOT and EPA Announce Next Steps Toward Tighter Tailpipe and




57. Janet Wilson, U.S. Emits Half of Car-Caused Greenhouse Gas, Study Says, L.A. TIMES,
June 28, 2006; Envtl. Def. Fund, Global Warming on the Road iv (2006), available at
http://www.edf.org/documents/5301 Globalwarmingontheroad.pdf.
58. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 287 (B. Metz et al. eds., 2007); see also Massachusetts, 549
U.S. at 525.
59. 49 U.S.C § 32902(f), (k) (2011).
60. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., supfra note 56.
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climate change.61 The array of stakeholders committed to
developing a single national program includes the Alliance of
.Automobile Manufacturers, BMW, Chrysler, General Motors,
Jaguar, Land Rover, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Porsche, Toyota,
Volkswagen, various medium and heavy-duty vehicle
manufacturers, and the California Air Resource Board. 62 No
consumer or service industry groups have yetjoined the program.
A. Manufacturer Challenges Under the Clean Air Act and the ECPA
Before manufacturers challenged state and local regulations
under the EPCA, they tested a similar preemption provision under
the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). Preemption under the CAA first
appeared before the Supreme Court in Engine Manufacturers
Association v. South Coast Air Quality Management District in 2004.63
Congress created Title II of the CAA to control emissions from
new motor vehicles64 and made it a goal "to encourage or
otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local
governmental actions . . . for pollution prevention."65 With the
enactment of the Air Quality Act of 1967, Congress amended Title
II to preempt states from setting emission standards for new motor
vehicles and engines.
In Engine Manufacturers, California imposed mandatory
alternative fuel vehicle purchasing requirements for street
sweepers, public transit vehicles, solid waste collection vehicles,
and airport passenger transportation vehicles, among other
vehicles.66 All the rules applied to public operators, whereas only
three applied to private operators.67 Notably, hybrid-electric and
dual-fuel technologies that use diesel fuel were not considered
alternative fuel technologies for the purposes of the rules.68
Section 209(a) of the CAA states: "No State or any political
subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard
61. Id.
62. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Stakeholder Commitment Letters, available at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/Laws+&+Regulations/CAFE+-+Fuel+Economy/Stakeholder+
Committment+ Letters (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
63. 541 U.S. 246 (2004).
64. Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, 42 §§ 7521 to 7525, 7541 to 7545, 7547
to 7550, 7552 to 7554, 7571 to 7574, 7581 to 7590 (2011).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c) (2011).
66. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n, 541 U.S. at 249.
67. Id. at 248-49.
68. Id. at 251 n.1.
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relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines subject to this part."69 The Court, with
Justice Scalia writing for the majority, found the California Rules to
be preempted in part by Section 209(a) because the rules
commanded a particular result and were accompanied by
sanctions.70 Essentially, the Court focused on the appropriate
meaning of enforcement and noted that mandatory rules fell
within the scope of the preemption provision of the CAA.
The second notable preemption challenge to state and local
regulations occurred in the fall of 2005. Perhaps emboldened by
the decision in Engine Manufacturers, automobile manufacturers
turned to other state and local regulations across the country. In
2005, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, General Motors,
Chrysler, and other automobile manufacturers challenged
regulations adopted by the State of Vermont that establish
greenhouse gas emissions standards for new automobiles. In doing
so, they again relied on the preemption provisions of the CAA, and
also invoked the preemption provision in the EPCA, which had not
yet been tested in the courts.7 1
Title II of the CAA provides a waiver for any state that could
show it required alternative standards to meet compelling and
extraordinary conditions, so long as the standards were consistent
with the federal emission standards. 72 The preemption provision
represented a compromise between states and manufacturers:
states wanting to preserve their role in regulating motor vehicles
and manufacturers wanting to avoid economic disruption inherent
in fifty different emissions standards.73 In this case, Vermont
standards were. identical to the California standards set forth in
California's AB 1493, which required the California Air Resources
Board ("CARB") 74 to "develop and adopt regulations that achieve
the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions from motor vehicles" no later than January 1, 2005.7
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2011).
70. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n, 541 U.S. at 258.
71. See Green Mtn. Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295
(D. Vt. 2007).
72. Id. at 303-04.
73. Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
74. CARB is a statewide regulatory body that California law designates as "the air
pollution control agency for all purposes set forth in federal law." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 39602 (2010).
75. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (2010).
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A similar case was brought by Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep against
CARB in the Eastern District of California around the same time.7 6
Both opinions were released after the Supreme Court decision
in Massachusetts v. EPA, which in part held that EPA's obligation to
regulate carbon emissions was "wholly independent of DOT's
mandate to promote energy efficiency."" Although the standards
were pending approval before the EPA, because California's AB
1493 fit within the statutory structure of the CAA and were
pending approval for waiver under Title II, the courts refused to
find the regulations preempted by the EPCA.78
Similarly with the CAA, the EPCA preemption provision reads:
When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this
chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State
may not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel
economy standards or average fuel economy standards for
automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard under
this chapter.79
The court concluded that the EPCA preemption provision must be
"construed as narrowly as the plain language of the law permits,"80
and found that the regulations were "sufficiently unrelated to fuel
economy standards." 81
Despite the initial success of engine manufacturers under the
CAA, courts interpreted the preemption provisions of the CAA
and the EPCA in a manner that balanced the traditional role of
states in regulating motor vehicles and air quality against the
efficiency of national uniform fuel economy standards. For the
greater history of the EPCA, the only invested stakeholders
appeared to be automobile manufacturers-this is because fuel
economy standards are directed at manufacturers developing new
vehicles for release into the United States marketplace. For that
reason, standards must be released eighteen months before the
beginning of the model year, to account for the research and
76. See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstone, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal.
2007).
77. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
78. See Green Mtn. Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295,
397-99 (D. Vt. 2007); see also Cent. Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1189.
79. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2010).
80. Cent. Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.
81. Green Mtn., 508 F. Supp. 2d at 398.
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development time in designing and producing a new vehicle for a
manufacturer's fleet. This provides full-line and limited-line
manufacturers with the flexibility to respond to changing market
and regulatory conditions.82 After Green Mountain and Central
Valley, it seemed that unless state or local governments created
mandatory obligations that fell outside the scope of the CAA and
interfered with either the EPA's emission controls or NHTSA fuel
economy standards, automobile manufacturers would not be
successful in challenging state and local efforts to mitigate climate
change.
B. A Summary and Critique of Service Industry Challenges Under the
CAA and the ECPA
After more than thirty years of federalism-based stability, an
unlikely group emerged and, for the first time, successfully
challenged state and local green initiatives through the seldom-
used EPCA preemption provision. In Boston, New York, Seattle,
and later Dallas,83 taxicab service industry groups invoked the
EPCA to protest state and municipal efforts to encourage green
purchasing. In the Northeast, local governments were outraged
that a 1975 law could be interpreted to preempt innovative efforts
to promote hybrid taxicabs.84 But in the Northwest, a district court
ruled that Congress could never have intended an absurd result
and found that the preemption provision must be much more
narrowly construed, particularly with respect to local matters, such
as taxicab licensing and fee regulation.85 Because the courts found
little assistance in their own circuits, they relied on the fact-specific
narratives of each case to create a discussion about preemption
and the EPCA. In order to understand the context of the courts'
reasoning, a brief summary of preemption in the United States
Supreme Court is required.
82. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FINAL RULE, supra note 42, at 3; see also
49 C.F.R. §§ 523, 531, 533-34, 536-37 (2011).
83. See Ass'n of Taxicab Operators v. City of Dallas, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140240, at
*11, *19 (N.D. Texas Aug. 30, 2010) (finding that CAA Sec. 209 preserves state and local
authority over use and operations of vehicles, and that the local ordinance is a voluntary
incentive program for purposes of the EPCA).
84. Press Release, N.Y.C. Gov't, Mayor Bloomberg Announces New Incentive,
Disincentive Program to Reach Goal of Green Taxi Fleet (Nov. 14, 2008) available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/html/2008b/pr455-08.html.
85. Green Alliance Taxi Cab Ass'n, Inc. v. King County, No. C08-1048RA, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 72409, at *13-14 (W.D. Wash.June 29, 2010).
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1. The United States Supreme Court's preemption analysis for "related
to" preemption provisions.
Justice Souter wrote in 1995 that preemption turns on
Congress' intent. The Court's analysis begins with the text of the
provision and follows with the structure and purpose of the act as
necessary.86 When the governing text is expansive and
indeterminate, courts must examine the objectives of the statute
"as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive."87 justice Thomas later explained that a "related to"
provision yields a two-part inquiry: if a state or local law has either
a (1) connection with or (2) reference to the federal subject
matter, the state or local law is preempted.88 Under the first
inquiry, the forbidden connection is revealed through an
examination of the objectives of the federal statute-specifically,
courts should look to (i) the scope of the federal law and (ii) the
nature of the effect of the state law.89 Under the second inquiry,
where a state's law "acts immediately and exclusively upon the
subject matter," or where the existence of the federal subject
matter is "essential to the law's operation . . . that reference will
result in preemption."90
2. Enforceable mandates and the elimination of consumer choice.
As in the City of Boston,91 the vast majority of leased taxicabs in
New York are Crown Victoria, non-hybrid vehicles.92 The Crown
Victoria models generally cost less than $10,000 and are often
purchased from police department' surpluses.93 The model
86. N.Y. Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
655 (1995).
87. Id. at 656.
88. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519
U.S. 316, 324 (1997) (citation omitted). In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, wrote that "related to" preemption provisions offer minimal clarity and
are not meant to set forth "a test for pre-emption, but rather to identify the field in which
ordinary field pre-emption applies." Id. at 336 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
89. See id. at 325 (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658-59).
90. Id.
91. See Noah Bierman & Matthew P. Collette, City Hopes Hyrid Taxis Gain Steam,
BOsTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 2008, at B2, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/
2008/03/09/cityhopeshybrid-taxis-gain.steam/.
92. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 7837, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 94021, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y.,June 22, 2009) (hereinafter "Metropolitan 1").
93. Bierman & Collette, supra note 91, at B2.
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averages thirteen miles per gallon.94 A hybrid vehicle, on the other
hand, can cost nearly $30,000 after being customized to meet local
taxicab regulations.95 This disparity in price leads most taxicab
companies to purchase the cheaper but less efficient Crown
Victoria vehicles for their fleet.
a. Metropolitan I.96
In December 2007, New York City ("NYC" or "the City")
issued rules requiring that new taxicabs put into service on or after
October 1, 2008, achieve at least 25 city miles per gallon of fuel
and that those put into service beginning on October 1, 2009,
achieve 30 city miles per gallon ("25/30 Rules").97 Although the
25/30 Rules did not explicitly require new vehicles to be hybrids,
the only cars that would satisfy the 25/30 Rules would be vehicles
with hybrid or clean diesel engines.98 And because taxis have a
mandatory retirement of three to five years in NYC, "essentially all
taxis in the City would be hybrids by 2012."99
Metropolitan Taxicab filed a complaint in federal district court
claiming that the EPCA preempted the 25/30 Rules. The court
agreed, finding that " [a] fair reading of the 25/30 Rules leads to
but one conclusion: the rules set standards that relate to an
average number of miles that New York City taxicabs must travel
per gallon of gasoline." 00 Notably, however, Judge Crotty did not
find that the CAA preempted the 25/30 Rules. The decision was
not appealed.
Although Judge Crotty found no preemption, a contrary legal
conclusion might be warranted. Though the 25/30 Rules did not
specify the emissions profile of a new vehicle, the direct
relationship between carbon dioxide emissions and fuel efficiency
could lead a court to find that the two characteristics are
necessarily connected. Following the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Engine Manufacturers Association, it is likely that such a necessary
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Metropolitan 1, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94021.
97. NEWYORKCiY, N.Y., TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N, tit. 35, §3.03(c)(10)-(11), 35
RCNY § 3-03(c) (10)-(1 1) (2007) (repealed).
98. Metropolitan !, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 94021, at *7.
99. Id. (referring to NEW YORK CyY, N.Y., TAXI & LIMOusINE COMM'N, tit. 35, §3-02
(2009)).
100. Metropolitan 1, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 94021, at *27.
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connection would cause the regulations to be preempted under
Section 209(a) of the CAA for compelling the purchase of certain
vehicles with particular emission characteristics.
b. Metropolitan II.101
Instead of appealing the ruling, NYC issued new rules that
regulated taxicab "lease caps," the maximum dollar amount per
shift for which taxis can be leased out by the owner, to provide
incentives for reduced fuel usage and cleaner taxis. 0 2 Under the
new rules, the lease caps for hybrid and clean diesel taxis are raised
by $3 per shift but reduced for non-hybrid, non-clean diesel
vehicles. 03 The rules would lower the per shift lease caps by $4 on
May 1, 2009; by $8 on May 1, 2010; and by $12 on May 1, 2011.104
Metropolitan Taxicab amended their initial complaint to
challenge the new rules and again moved for a preliminary
injunction, citing the preemption provisions of both the EPCA and
the CAA. 05 The district court held that the new rules were likely to
be preempted by both the EPCA and the CAA. 06
In the district court's opinion, Judge Crotty emphasized the
economic impact of the rules. The City stressed that the rules were
designed to shift the cost structure of the taxicab industry in New
York to force taxicab companies to internalize some of the cost of
fuel. That is, because drivers are normally responsible for pump
station costs, the companies have minimal incentive to purchase
fuel-efficient vehicles. With lower lease caps for non-hybrid and
non-clean diesel vehicles, the companies would now be financially
affected by their own purchasing choices. One of Metropolitan
Taxicab's experts testified that the result of the lowered lease cap
would reduce profits by 65% to 75% for each non-hybrid or non-
clean diesel vehicle. 0 7 The City did not challenge the estimated
impact, but confirmed that fleet owners could still make a
101. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83 (S.D.N.Y.
2009), affd. 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2011)
(hereinafter "Metropolitan II").
102. Id. at 89.
103. N.Y.C. TLC § 1-78(a) (3) (ii) (2010).
104. Id.
105. Metropolitan II, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 86-87.
106. Id. at 103-05.
107. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2011) (hereinafter "Metropolitan
Appeal").
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"reasonable rate of return." 0 The court understood the City's
argument to mean that "any rate structure that yields more than
$1 in profit does not 'compel' or mandate a result," but
disagreed 09 and found that the "Lease Cap Rules do not present
viable options for Fleet Owners; that they instead operate as an
effective mandate to switch to hybrid vehicles.""10
Under the CAA, the Metropolitan II court explained that the
clear and only purpose of the lease cap rules "is to affect taxicab
emissions by mandating the purchase of 'cleaner vehicles."""'
Relying again on the assumption that the incentive program is
effectively a regulatory mandate, the court declared that the rules
"directly affect the level of emissions.""12 And because section
209(a) of the CAA "specifically reserves emissions regulation for
new vehicles to the federal government,""13 any state or local rules
that are aimed at reducing emissions-including, according to the
court, the lease cap rules-would be preempted.
Here, the court improperly relied on the extreme end of an
incentive program: a rate structure that yields $1 in profit. Neither
the City's experts nor Metropolitan Taxicab's experts testified that
the rate structure yielded a mere $1 in profit-in fact, taxicab
companies would net at minimum a 25% profit under the City's
program-and instead made a ruling based on a hypothetical
extreme. Even if the court could properly consider this
hypothetical, a profit of $1 still provides a choice. The EPCA's
preemption provision precludes, as under the CAA, only directly
enforceable standards, that is, standards that leave no choice to the
consumer. The CAA preemption provision explains that the only
state or local rules preempted are those that "attempt to enforce any
standard relating to the control of emissions."114 The lease cap
rules neither command nor control the development or
manufacture of any motor vehicle emissions standard and certainly
do not create an enforceable emissions profile. Justice Scalia even
noted in Engine Manufacturers that " [v]oluntary programs . . . are
significantly different from command-and-control regulation.
108. Id. at 155.
109. Metropolitan II, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 100.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 104.
112. Id. at 105.
113. Id.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
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Suffice it to say that nothing in the present opinion necessarily
entails preemption of voluntary programs."1" 5 Unlike with a
mandatory purchasing scheme, voluntary incentive packages do
not entail an enforceability component; that is, the purchaser's
right to buy remains intact. 16 Here, the City could not compel any
taxicab companies to purchase a hybrid vehicle: that choice
remained an exercise of business judgment.
c. Ophirv. Boston." 7
As in NYC, the City of Boston created a voluntary incentive
program to promote hybrid vehicles called CleanAir Cabs.' 8 The
program contained several financial incentives to encourage
hybrid taxicab use. However, Boston did not obtain the results it
desired."'9 The city had hoped for at least one hundred new hybrid
taxicabs, and after eighteen months, only thirty-two had been
purchased.120 By August 2008, the plan was abandoned and Boston
imposed mandatory purchasing rules.' 2 '
The Boston Taxi Owners Association quickly challenged the
clean taxi mandate. Akin to the 25/30 Rules in Metropolitan I,
Boston's Rule 403 required "[e]very vehicle put into service as a
taxi as of August 29, 2008, [to] be a new Clean Taxi vehicle . ."122
This rule, the court found, unduly limits consumer choice.'23 In
doing so, the court referred to one of the four factors the NHTSA
considers in setting fuel economy standards: economic
practicability.
Through rulemaking, NHTSA interprets economic
practicability to mean "standards should not be so stringent as to
create 'adverse economic consequences, such as a significant loss
115. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 258 (2004)
(emphasis in original).
116. See, e.g., id. at 255.
117. Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D. Mass. 2009).
118. CITY OF BOSTON, CleanAir CABS Brochure, available at http://www.bphc.org/
programs/cib/environmentalhealth/forms%20%20documents/boston%20Cleanair%20c
absb.pdf.
119. See Bierman & Collette, supra note 91, at B2.
120. Id.
121. Press Release, City of Boston, Mayor Menino Announces Taxi Fleet to be Fully
Hybrid by 2015 (Aug. 29, 2008), available at http://www.cityofboston.gov/news/
default.aspx?id=3967.
122. Ophii; 647 F. Supp. at 87-88 (citing BOSTON, MASS. POLICE DEP'T RuLE 403, § 3,
11(a) (2010)).
123. Id. at 93-94.
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of jobs or the unreasonable elimination of consumer choice."" 24
The court explained that a state or local government could not
dictate consumer choices, even if the class of purchasers was small,
because "if one State or [local government] may enact such rules,
then so may any other; and the end result would undo Congress's
carefully calibrated regulatory scheme." 25 And because NHTSA
might consider consumer choice as a quality of one of the four
balancing factors which it weighs in setting fuel economy
standards, the court believed that any state or local regulation that
so heavily directs consumer choice must be preempted. 2 6
Though the Ophir court found both Metropolitan I and
Metropolitan II to be persuasive authority,'27 the decision rests on
factual similarities to Metropolitan I: New York City's 25/30 Rules
and Boston's Rule 403 both unquestionably restrict consumer
choice and are mandatory programs. Whether the mandatory
programs are sufficiently related to fuel economy standards is an
impact inquiry and will be discussed in a section infra. It remains to
be answered whether the court would have reached a similar
conclusion under Boston's originally enacted voluntary CleanAir
Cabs program.
3. Voluntary incentives: Green Alliance v. King County.
The court in Green Alliance faced a different regulatory plan
than the programs in New York and Massachusetts. Here, King
County capped the total number of taxicab licenses available in the
county, but allowed new licenses to be recycled from a pool of
previously issued licenses, unless the County determines "that
there is a demand for additional taxi service." 28 If a greater
demand is determined, the executive services director "may issue
all or a portion of those [pooled] licenses through a request for
proposals ["RFP"] process designed to test alternatives to the
current local taxi industry model."' 2 9 The RFP issued on March 6,
2008, targeted new taxicab licensees in the county and required
124. Id. (quoting Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. Proposed Rules, 67 Fed. Reg.
77015-01, 77021 (proposed Dec. 16, 2002)).
125. Id. at 94 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541
U.S. 246, 255 (2004)).
126. Id. at 93.
127. Ophir, 647 F. Supp. at 91.
128. KING COUNTY, WASH. CODE § 6.64.700(B) (2010).
129. Id. § 6.64.700(C) (2).
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that the selected taxicab association agree to utilize hybrid electric
vehicles "with a minimum rating of 40 miles per gallon in the
city."13 0 Green Cab was selected to receive the licenses issued
under the RFP. 31 Green Alliance and the Seattle Taxi Owners
Association filed a lawsuit, requesting that the court invalidate the
fuel efficiency requirements set forth in Rule LIC 8-3, as
preempted by the EPCA.132
In contrast to the regulatory mandates in the Northeast, the
court found that King County implemented a voluntary incentive
program, which "allows entities to opt in to a licensing program
and adopt its requirements."13 3 The court explained that "a rule
incentivizing the purchase or use of hybrid vehicles is legitimate as
long as it does not compel or bind parties to a particular choice,"
and concluded that the EPCA did not apply.134 Moreover, the
court seemed to suggest that the King County program had a de
minimis impact, "involving the issuance of a mere 50 taxicab
licenses." 135
4. Formulaic textualism: Metropolitan II in the Second Circuit.
After Judge Crotty granted the preliminary injunction against
NYC's lease cap rules, the City sought review in the Second Circuit.
In just four pages, the Second Circuit rejected the reasoning from
the district court and held that the distinction between hybrid and
non-hybrid vehicles essentially targets fuel economy standards and
was therefore plainly "within the scope of the EPCA preemption
provision."1 3 6 The reviewing court found Judge Crotty's attention
to the economic impact of the rules to be misguided. Instead, the
court discerned that NYC's new rules are virtually a "complete
overlap of the approved vehicles under the 25/30 MPG rule" and
that under the City's regulatory plan, hybrid is "simply a proxy for
130. Green Alliance Taxi Cab Ass'n, Inc. v. King County, No. C08-1048RAJ, 2010 WL
2643369, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2010) (quoting King County Admin. Rule, LIC 8-3 §
6.4.4).
131. Id. at *2.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *5.
134. Id. at *13-14 (referring to Metropolitan II, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 93) (noting that a
preemption analysis is irrelevant if a particular rule is not a mandate because the rule "is
not forcing [the regulated parties] to take any new action - much less a potentially
preempted action").
135. Id. at *5.
136. Metropolitan Appeal, 615 F.3d at 158.
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'greater fuel efficiency."" 3 7 In short, the new rules "rely on fuel
economy, and on nothing else, as the criterion for determining
the applicable lease cap." 3 8 The Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's preliminary injunction and did not reach the
preemption provision of the CAA.
Although the court correctly began with the EPCA's
preemption language, the preemption language is ambiguous and
unhelpful. Congress clearly intended to use expansive language,
but "[i]f 'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of
its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes preemption
would never run its course, for 'really, universally, relations stop
nowhere."" 39 As stated above, in order for a state law to "relate to"
the subject matter of the federal act, there must be some tangible
connection with or impermissible reference to the preempted
subject matter. As discussed further infra, the Second Circuit failed
to follow through with either of these inquiries.
More fundamentally, the Second Circuit court misunderstood
the subject matter that section 32919(a) was designed to preempt:
fuel economy standards and not simply fuel efficiency. Before any
court could properly determine the scope of the "related to"
language, the court must properly understand the subject matter
that is regulated under the EPCA. Here, Congress did not leave
that undefined. Congress defined the average fuel economy
standard as the "performance standard specifying a minimum
level of average fuel economy applicable to a manufacturer in a
model year." 40 Fuel economy is defined as the "average number
of miles traveled by an automobile for each gallon of gasoline (or
equivalent amount of other fuel) used, as determined by the
Administrator under section 32904(c) of this title."14' Section
32904 refers to the methods and procedures for calculating the
average fuel economy standard, wherein the standard is prescribed
for the manufacturer of a model.142 Thus, under an appropriate
interpretation of the scope of section 32919(a), in order for a state
or local regulation to relate to fuel economy standards or average
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (citation omitted).
140. 49 U.S.C. § 32901(a)(6) (2011).
141. Id. 32901(a)(11)
142. See id. § 32904(c).
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fuel economy standards, it should somehow relate to the testing
and calculation procedures involved in setting standards for
automobile fleets produced by a manufacturer in that model
year. 43 A state or local regulation that draws a distinction in the
consumer market between vehicles with greater or lesser fuel-
efficiency has little, if any, bearing on the NHTSA's process of
calculating fuel economy standards for automobile manufacturers.
Thus, the appropriate inquiry under the EPCA's preemption
provision is whether a state or local regulation is related to
performance standards specifying a minimum level of average
miles traveled by an automobile as determined by the
Administrator applicable to a manufacturer in a model year. If the
state or local regulation does not relate to the Administrator's
determination, the regulation is not preempted by the EPCA.
Moreover, the impact of a de facto mandate only remotely
affects the future consumer market for fuel-efficient vehicles,
which is just one criteria that NHTSA may consider. The United
States filed an amicus brief with the Second Circuit on behalf of
the EPA and the DOT, stating that the lease cap rules "are not
likely to have a significant impact on the overall federal regulation
of the average fuel economy of automobile manufacturers." 14 The
rules merely target the cost considerations that underlie vehicle-
purchasing decisions of a small percentage of the overall taxicab
market in New York City.145 They do not require any particular
decision.
But even if the court were to accept that regulatory mandates,
if aggregated across the country, could potentially impact the
NHTSA's economic analysis, a voluntary incentive program that
leaves two profitable choices is not a defacto mandate. Ultimately,
the purchaser still has a right to buy. The City has not usurped that
right by mandating a particular option, but merely attempts to
encourage a greener choice, while leaving two profitable
outcomes. Through restructuring the relationship between taxicab
owners and taxicab drivers, the City simply pushes the industry to
internalize the direct costs of a purchasing decision. This
restructuring bears no relationship to the automobile
143. See id. § 32919(a).
144. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees
and Affirmance at 14, Metropolitan Appeal, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2010), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/htmI/planyc2O30/downiloads/pdf/brief for us arnicus curiae.pdf.
145. See id. at 14.
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manufacturing industry, nor does it interfere with the NHTSA's
duty to set fuel economy standards.
The court also erroneously believed that NYC's technological
distinction was "simply a proxy for 'greater fuel efficiency,"' 14 6
which the court conflates with fuel economy standards. Though
dual engine technology often correlates with a particular vehicle's
fuel efficiency, of the eleven SUV-hybrids that were available in
2010 and had listed combined miles per gallon, only three models
achieved a minimum 30 miles per gallon and six had a combined
rating below 25 miles per gallon.147 It cannot be said that the
technological distinction necessarily stands in for greater fuel
efficiency because seven SUV-hybrids available in 2010 could not
satisfy the 25/30 Rules of 2007, which the court found so
problematic.
Because a mere handful of district courts have discussed the
preemption provision of the EPCA, the Second Circuit's
fundamental errors and misconceptions have the potential to echo
across the country. Of course, other district courts and circuits may
reject the Second Circuit's reasoning, but an eventual circuit split
could ultimately lead to argument before the Supreme Court.
V. THE FUTURE OF LOCAL GREEN INITIATIVES
On November 5, 2010, NYC filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari to correct the Second Circuit's reading of the EPCA's
preemption provision and to protect state and local government
green vehicle incentive programs. Although the certiorari was
ultimately denied, below are the arguments presented in the
petition.
A. NYC's Petition for Certiorari
On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, NYC challenged
the Second Circuit's determination that Congress intended to
preempt state and local governments from adopting incentive
programs to promote the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles.148
146. Metropolitan Appeal, 615 F.3d at 158.
147. Ilyirid SUV Roundup, HYBRIDCARS, July 10, 2009, http://www.hybridcars.com/
hybrid-suv.
148. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at i, Metropolitan Appeal, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir.




First, NYC argued .that the Second Circuit incorrectly applied the
Supreme Court's preemption analysis by ignoring the express
purpose and legislative history of the EPCA and failing to discuss
the Supreme Court's line of "forbidden connections" cases. 149
Second, NYC argued that the decision frustrates the intent of
Congress and endangers hundreds of state and local fuel-efficient
vehicle incentive programs. 50
1. The Second Circuit's preemption analysis is inconsistent with the
preemption jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
NYC asserted that the Second Circuit "erred by failing to
consider the structure, purpose and history of the statute in order
to determine what Congress intended the reach of the EPCA
preemption provision to be."' 5'
In reading the EPCA, NYC argued that the preemption
provision permits regulations that do not set fuel economy
standards and that do not interfere with federal regulation of the
average fuel economy of automobile manufactures. 5 2 This reading
is consistent with the intent of the EPCA to "preempt state
regulation of fuel economy standards so that automobile
manufactures would not be required to comply with myriad
differing standards." 53 The Second Circuit's reading of the
provision, conversely, casts too wide a net into a field which the
states have long occupied: the regulation of lease rates for taxicab
vehicles.
To determine the limits of the EPCA preemption provision,
NYC pointed to the Supreme Court's line of "forbidden
connection" cases, which the Second Circuit largely ignored.
Essentially, the "forbidden connection" cases "draw[] a clear
distinction between state laws that act as incentives and those that
are actual or defacto mandates." 5 4 The cited cases address a similar
"related to" preemption provision in the Employee Retirement
149. See id. at 9-20.
150. See id.at 20-28.
151. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 10, Metropolitan Appea 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir.
2010).
152. See id. at 14.
153. Id. at 8-9.
154. Id. at 16 (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Const.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658-59 (1995)).
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Income Security Act ("ERISA") context, under which "meaningful
alternative [s] " that do not "dictate the choices" or "bind [] ERISA
plan administers" preserve the existing structure of ERISA and are
not preempted. 155 Here, NYC argued that although the district
court addressed the distinction between voluntary incentive
programs and legislative mandates, it incorrectly concluded that
the hybrid rules operated as a de facto mandate to purchase new
hybrid vehicles; moreover, the Second Circuit ignored the
distinction altogether and should have reached the issue.
a. Additional arguments against preemption.
The City could also have challenged the Second Circuit's
holding under the second prong of Justice Thomas' test. Under
that prong, where a state's law acts "immediately and exclusively"
upon the subject matter, or where the existence of the federal
subject matter is "essential to the law's operation . . . that
'reference' will result in preemption."156 An impermissible
reference seems to be the underlying rationale for the Second
Circuit's finding that NYC's lease cap rules are preempted by the
EPCA, that is, the NYC rules rely on CAFE standards to be
enforceable, despite the argument that hybrid engine technologies
do not rely on precisely calculated fuel economy standards. 57
Nevertheless, through both prongs of the test, a reviewing court
must be wary to extend the "related to" limiting term to its
indefinite extreme.s58 As with the forbidden connection line of
cases, the impermissible reference inquiry requires a meaningful
relationship with the preempted subject matter.'59
It could be argued that the 25/30 Rules impermissibly rely on
fuel economy standards because the existence of a fuel economy
standard is essential to carrying out the City's Rules. That is, unless
NHTSA sets fuel standards for automobiles, the City might not be
able to identify which vehicles satisfy its own conditions. However,
the hybrid/non-hybrid distinction found within the lease cap rules
requires no such federal action. As introduced above, referring to
a vehicle's engine technology is not a proxy for fuel economy
standards. Restructuring the owner/driver relationship in the
155. See id. at 17-19 (citations omitted).
156. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325 (citations omitted).
157. See Metropolitan Appeal at 156-57.
158. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655.
159. Id. at 661; Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325.
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taxicab industry neither immediately nor exclusively acts on the
NHTSA's role in setting fuel economy standards, nor is a fuel
economy standard essential to the lease cap rule's operation.
Simply put, the lease cap rules make no-reference to fuel economy
standards or average fuel economy standards, let alone an
impermissible reference that would result in federal preemption.
In fact, Congress actively promotes and supports state and local
programs designed to promote fuel-efficient vehicles.
b. Congress acknowledges and supports state and local incentive
programs that promote fuel-effi cient vehicles.
Postdating the 1975 enactment of the EPCA, Congress passed
the Energy Policy Act of 1992,160 the 2005 Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
("SAFETEA-LU"),161 and the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and
Save Program of 2009 ("CARS" or "Cash for Clunkers").162 The
passage of these acts explicitly demonstrates Congress' continued
recognition and support of state and local efforts to promote fuel-
efficient vehicles.' 63 Moreover, in recognition of the importance of
cutting greenhouse gas emissions, state and local governments
have even partnered with federal agencies to build incentive
programs. For example, the United States Department of Energy
tracks incentive programs in the various states and "provides a
factsheet designed to help cities adopt successful 'green taxi'
programs," even encouraging lease rate incentives for hybrid
vehicles.164 As a result of federal encouragement, many state and
local governments have begun promoting fuel-efficient vehicle use
by developing consumer incentive programs, all of which are now
at risk because of the Second Circuit's broad interpretation of the
preemption provision of the EPCA.
2. Shutting down our laboratories of innovation.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Supremacy Clause
may entail preemption of state or local law either by express
160. 42 U.S.C. § 13201 (1992) (amended 2005).
161. 23 U.S.C. § 101 (2008).
162. 49 U.S.C. § 32901 (2009).
163. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 21, Metropolitan Appea, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir.
2010).
164. Id. at 28.
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provision, by implication, or by a conflict between federal and state
law. 165 And where Congress derogates state regulation, the analysis
begins with the presumption that Congress does not intend to
supplant state law, "particularly in those [cases] in which Congress
has 'legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied."' 166 The Court works with the "assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."16 7
Local governments have traditionally regulated the networks of
transportation within their boundaries in order to protect the
general health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.168 They manage
transportation to ease mobility and promote efficiency, safety, and
air quality.169 Each city is a complex system that requires flexibility
in providing innovative solutions for each set of problems. New
York adopted its lease cap rules to correct the "structural problem
with the standard vehicle lease arrangement that artificially
insulated fleet owners from fuel costs,"7 0 the effect of which may
encourage some taxicab companies to purchase more fuel-efficient
vehicles. Local governments encourage greener and cleaner
vehicles through a variety of plans, including tax incentives, sales
rebates, parking incentives, high-occupancy vehicle lane
exemptions, and a host of other incentives.' 7' In order to preserve
that flexibility, state and local governments must have some degree
of certainty before undertaking new programs. Without the
regulatory space for experimentation, innovation may be shut
down altogether.
165. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
166. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009) (citations omitted).
167. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
168. See, e.g., Brief for the City of Chicago et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Metropolitan Appeal petition for cert, at 9-10 (citing Buck v. California, 343 U.S.
99, 102 (1952); Karpark Corp. v. Town of Graham, 99 F. Supp. 124, 128 (D.C.N.C. 1951);
Detroit, Fort Wayne, & Belle Isle Railway v. Osborn, 189 U.S. 383, 390 (1903)), available at
http://sblog.s3. amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/02-25-Metropolitan-
Taxicab-Amicus-Chicago.pdf; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Police Court, 251 U.S. 22, 25-
26 (1919).
169. See City of Chicago et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Metropolitan
Appeal petition for cert. at 20.
170. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Metropolitan Appeal, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir.
2010).
171. See id. at 24-27.
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Several local governments, including Boston, Dallas, and
Seattle have been sued for similar taxicab regulations, which
promote hybrid or electric vehicles.'72 And many others are
considering a variety of creative solutions to reducing our
country's dependence on fossil fuels, which contribute to
greenhouse gas emissions and threaten national security. 73 For
example, the City of Chicago charges a higher license fee for
residents who own larger passenger vehicles. 7 4 Portland works with
local utilities and automobile manufacturers to promote electric
vehicles, notably by installing charging infrastructure throughout
the region and adopting some exclusively electric vehicle parking
spaces in the city streets. 75 The Philadelphia Parking Authority's
rules for taxicab age parameters and taxicab mileage parameters
carve out separate requirements for hybrid vehicles. 76 And Salt
Lake City offers free parking at city meters for low-emission and
fuel-efficient vehicles. 77
Because virtually every green vehicle incentive program draws
distinctions based on technological characteristics of an
automobile, or relates in some way to a vehicle's fuel efficiency,
adopting the Second Circuit's holding would nullify hundreds of
state and local rules and regulations around the country. In fact,
on November 19, 2010, the Minneapolis City Council unanimously
passed a resolution to halt the enforcement of its taxicab fuel
efficiency requirements found in Minneapolis Code of Ordinance
§ 341.300 in light of the Second Circuit's decision and has been
unable to pursue new regulations aimed at incentivizing the
utilization of fuel efficient and environmentally sustainable
taxicabs. 78 Even in Seattle, where the district court found the
172. See infra IV.B.
173. See, e.g., Brief for the City of Chicago et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Metropolitan Appeal petition for cert. at 28-29, available at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.coin/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/02-25-Metropolitan-
Taxicab-Amicus-Chicago.pdf.
174. See CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 3-56-050 (2010).
175. See, e.g, Zach McDonald, ECOtality Detail Plans for Oregon Public Charging
Infrastrmcture, PLUGINCARS (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.plugincars.com/ecotality-details-
plans-oregon-public-charging-infrastructure-77951 .html.
176. SeePHILA., PA., PUB. UTIL. CODE, tit. 52, §§ 1017.3-1017.4 (2011).
177. See SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 12.56.205 (2011).
178. Minneapolis City Council Res. 2010R-570, (Nov. 19, 2010) (authorizing the city
attorney to join in the filing of an Arnicus Brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of
City of New York et al. v. Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade et al.), available at http://www.ci.
minneapolis.mn.us/council/archives/proceedings/2010/201011 19-proceedings.pdf.
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hybrid licensing program was not preempted by the EPCA, the
2008 ordinance authorizing rules mandating vehicle size, fuel
efficiency, and emissions requirements for new taxicabs has not
been adopted in light of the new ruling.'79
Broadly holding that mere reference to a vehicle's
environmental attributes is enough for federal preemption
endangers the EPCA's goal for encouraging innovation. With
respect to local transportation and local air quality, state and local
autonomy matters; experiments are needed and encouraged, not
only to address local problems, but also to educate other
governments about working solutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nothing in the language of the EPCA or the historical context
of its passage indicates that Congress chose to displace the
regulation of taxicab licensing and lease fee caps, which,
historically, has been a matter of local concern. To read the
preemption provision as displacing all state and local laws affecting
consumer choice for greener and cleaner vehicles on the theory
that they indirectly relate to fuel economy standards would
effectively read the limiting language of section 32919(a) out of
the statute, and violate basic principles of statutory interpretation.
"Preemption does not occur ... if the state law has only a tenuous,
remote, or peripheral connection with [the subject matter of
federal regulation], as is the case with many laws of general
applicability." 8 0
Adopting a broad and absolute interpretation of section
32919(a) endangers hundreds of state and local incentive
programs aimed at encouraging consumers to purchase greener
and cleaner vehicles with only a tenuous relationship to NHTSA's
authority to set fuel economy standards. Particularly, the hybrid
vehicle is particularly vulnerable because the car's unique dual
engine system popularly suggests greater fuel efficiency. The
Second Circuit's expansive ruling ignores the functional roles of
the federal and local governments preserved by the CAA and the
179. See, e.g., Brief for the City of Chicago et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Metropolitan Appeal petition for cer. at 29, available at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp content/uploads/201 1/02/02-25-Metropolitan-
Taxicab-Amicus-Chicago.pdf.
180. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 n.1
(1992) (citation omitted).
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EPCA, and discourages local governments from "try[ing] novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country,"181 placing countless laboratories for innovation at risk of
shutting down.
181. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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